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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress has created a mechanism through which victims of securities fraud 
may pursue remedies for their losses against perpetrators. That mechanism 
includes the substantive prohibitions of the federal securities laws as well as the 
procedural pathways established by the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (PSLRA) and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence. 
Some federal courts have modified this mechanism by creating access barriers 
to remedies for securities fraud victims at the pleading, class-certification, and 
summary-judgment stages. In this article, we delineate those access barriers and 
question both their constitutionality and wisdom. 
II 
REWRITING RULES AND STATUTES TO CRAFT PRE-TRIAL ACCESS BARRIERS 
In some federal jurisdictions, the requirements of the PSLRA and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence have been rewritten by the 
courts to erect merits barriers at three key pre-trial litigation stages that force 
plaintiffs to prove their case to a judge, often without the benefit of discovery, 
before they can reach a jury. 
A. Pleading Scienter to Survive a Motion to Dismiss 
Some federal courts have redesigned the pleading standard under the 
PSLRA and the federal rules to steeply discount allegations of scienter that are 
based on circumstantial evidence. Under the PSLRA, plaintiffs must “state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with 
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the required state of mind.”1 The required state of mind is scienter—that is, 
“intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”2 Federal courts have also 
determined that recklessness is sufficient to establish scienter in actions for 
securities fraud.3 In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme 
Court interpreted “strong inference” to mean that a securities fraud complaint 
will survive dismissal only if “a reasonable person would deem the inference of 
scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could 
draw from the facts alleged.”4 The Court later reaffirmed that the scienter 
standard “requires courts to take into account plausible opposing inferences.”5 
Although Tellabs’s weighing process may have reasonably interpreted the 
PSLRA, the Court’s standard leaves room for courts considering a motion to 
dismiss to discount the kind of circumstantial evidence of scienter that would 
otherwise be sufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden of proof at trial. 
Circumstantial evidence gives rise to two equally plausible inferences. In 
contrast, direct evidence is evidence from which there is only one plausible 
inference. Direct evidence of a defendant’s mental state is rare because it is 
usually limited to an actual admission by the defendant under oath or the 
testimony of a witness based upon personal knowledge. Thus, before Tellabs, 
circumstantial evidence of scienter was commonly pleaded and accepted by 
alleging that the defendant had a motive and an opportunity to engage in fraud, 
and had access to information that discussed the fraud or concerned the 
company’s core operations.6 Tellabs did not eliminate the use of circumstantial 
evidence in pleading, but rather held that when two inferences are equally 
plausible, the tie goes to the plaintiff.7 And circumstantial evidence is still 
accepted both explicitly and in application by several federal courts.8 
Nonetheless, since Tellabs, some federal courts have erroneously steeply 
discounted circumstantial evidence of scienter.9 Even though the federal courts 
 
 1.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 2011). 
 2.  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). The PSLRA heightened Rule 8(a) 
and Rule 9(b), which together make clear that plaintiffs do not have to plead a defendant’s mental state 
in a fraud claim with particularity. See FED R. CIV. P. 8(a), 9(b). 
 3.  See, e.g., Konkol v. Diebold, Inc., 590 F.3d 390, 396 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 4.  551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007). The Court set out to resolve whether and to what extent district 
judges should consider non-culpable inferences when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Id. at 309. 
 5.  Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1324–25 (2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 6.  See J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 1.05[4][e] 
(2010).  
 7.  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324. 
 8.  See, e.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc. (Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702, 709–12 (7th Cir. 
2008) (determining that material misrepresentations by company’s top executives regarding flagship 
products with corroborating allegations based on twenty-seven confidential witnesses in positions likely 
to have access to pleaded information created strong inference of scienter).  
 9.  At least one court has rejected circumstantial evidence entirely, requiring direct evidence of 
state of mind. In an unpublished, nonprecedential decision, the Eleventh Circuit made explicit what is 
implicit in many cases—a complaint that fails to allege direct evidence of scienter provides district 
courts room to steeply discount allegations of scienter based on circumstantial evidence and will be 
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have said that allegations of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to create a 
“strong inference” of scienter and even reiterated that mere recklessness is 
enough to satisfy the pleading standard, some courts in their application have 
found that the inference of scienter is less likely than virtually any other non-
culpable mental state, even including negligence,10 ignorance,11 motive to 
improve the business,12 and belief that undisclosed information was not 
material.13 For example, in Konkol v. Diebold, Inc., the Sixth Circuit said 
circumstantial evidence of recklessness was enough, but then found that 
circumstantial allegations, including that defendants had access to and used 
reports with non-disclosed information, engaged in insider sales, and that a 
confidential witness would testify to their knowledge, were not enough to make 
the inference of scienter at least as likely as an inference that the defendants 
engaged in honest activity.14 Instead, the court required “specific facts” that 
 
dismissed. In Durgin v. Mon, 415 F. App’x 161 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), the plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendants knew that representations regarding certain loans were with recourse (as opposed to 
nonrecourse) because the loans made up seventy percent of the company’s net worth and because the 
defendants signed guarantees. Id. at 166. But the Eleventh Circuit held that the inference of scienter 
was not as compelling as an inference that the defendants acted with inexcusable neglect. Id. at 167. 
The court wanted the plaintiffs to allege direct evidence of fraud, for example, that the defendants had 
told someone that the loan was not “non-recourse.” Id. at 165. As we show, however, discounting 
circumstantial evidence (or prohibiting it entirely) is improper.  
 10.  See Dronsejko v. Grant Thornton, 632 F.3d 658, 667, 670 (10th Cir. 2011) (determining it was 
more plausible that auditor was negligent than deliberately reckless when it certified as “probable 
collectability” a collection rate that was barely over fifty percent); In re Ceridian Corp., Sec. Litig., 542 
F.3d 240, 248–49 (8th Cir. 2008); Local 295/Local 851 IBT Employer Grp. Pension Trust & Welfare 
Fund v. Fifth Third Bancorp., 731 F. Supp. 2d 689, 727–28 (S.D. Ohio 2010). 
 11.  See Glazer Capital Mgmt., LLP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 746–47 (9th Cir. 2008) (deciding it 
was more plausible that CEO was unaware of bribes paid by the company’s foreign sales agent even 
though the company was small and had limited foreign customers and products, because by its nature 
bribery is “surreptitious”). 
 12.  See Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Coll., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(concluding it was more plausible that CFO’s statement that admission counselors were “gray area” 
was a general exhortation to improve business rather than a “winking” suggestion to admit unqualified 
students).  
 13.  See City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Waters Corp., 632 F.3d 751, 
758–59 (1st Cir. 2011) (determining it was plausible that even if executives knew about a regulatory 
change in a foreign market, they may not have considered it significant, even though the regulatory 
change happened in a market that accounted for ten percent of total foreign sales). A related inference 
is that the defendants knew circumstances were bad, but did not think they were so bad that their 
concealment constituted fraud, as in Slayton v. American Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 775–76 (2d Cir. 
2010), in which the court said that it was more plausible that defendants did not know of the extent of 
the deterioration in a high-yield portfolio. Whether this is a legitimate competing inference is in doubt 
after Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011), in which the Court concluded that 
the inference that executives knew about adverse drug reports but did not think they were statistically 
significant was at least as likely as the inference of scienter. Id. at 1324–25. 
 14.  590 F.3d 390, 397–404 (6th Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs sued Diebold, Inc., a manufacturer of 
voting machines and ATMs, and its executives alleging that they (1) inflated revenue by booking 
revenue from sales of voting machines to municipalities that the company knew would not satisfy 
government regulations; (2) sent phony invoices to customers to inflate revenue; and (3) bundled 
service contracts with other products and prematurely recognized revenue from the service contracts. 
Id. at 395. To allege scienter, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had access to detailed financial 
reports and real-time accounting information that disclosed the fraud, attended high-level accounting 
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defendants had knowledge of the fraud, and steeply discounted the confidential 
witness statement of this knowledge.15 Similarly, in Matrix Capital Management 
Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., the court of appeals began by stating that 
recklessness was sufficient to establish scienter, but then refused to allow a jury 
to infer it from circumstantial evidence including red flags and even an 
admission that the environment was conducive to fraud.16 
The federal courts have compounded their erroneous discounting of 
circumstantial evidence in two ways. First, there is a growing trend of 
discounting allegations that are based on confidential witness statements.17 
Plaintiffs often rely on confidential witnesses to try to satisfy the rigorous 
pleading demands of the PSLRA18—these witnesses can often provide accounts 
of what top executives knew. Yet, the federal courts have used Tellabs to 
undermine the availability of these witness accounts. For example, in Zucco 
Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., the court discounted six confidential 
witnesses and said the complaint lacked “specific admissions from top 
executives.”19 No substantive area of law requires plaintiffs to disclose their 
 
meetings, that confidential witnesses said the executives knew what was going on, that five of these 
executives sold nearly 40,000 shares in the two weeks after the company inflated its earnings to an all-
time high, that SEC and DOJ were investigating the company for accounting violations, and that a 
memorandum from outside counsel told executives that their voting machines would not comply with 
government regulations. Id. at 397–403. The Sixth Circuit said many of these allegations were too 
conclusory or not particularized enough to raise an inference of scienter. Id. at 404. 
 15.  Id. at 398–99. 
 16.  576 F.3d 172, 181, 183, 187–90 (4th Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs sued BearingPoint (a management 
and technology consulting company), its former president, and its CFO, alleging that they misstated the 
company’s revenue, earnings per share, net income, and good will. Id. at 176–80. According to the 
plaintiffs, the company acquired foreign consulting businesses but lacked the internal controls needed 
to get these firms to adhere to accepted accounting practices. Id. at 177. Yet the company continued to 
express confidence in the reliability of its accounting and claimed in public reports that the company 
had resolved material accounting issues. Id. at 177–79. Eventually, the company announced that it had 
overstated its income by over $90 million, was taking a good will write down of over $150 million, and 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Id. at 176, 178–80. To allege that the defendants knowingly and 
recklessly issued false financial statements, the plaintiffs alleged that (1) the company later admitted its 
management was incompetent and that it had an environment conducive to accounting fraud; (2) red 
flags alerted the executives to the accounting improprieties, including that an employee spoke with one 
of the defendants about the serious problems with internal controls; and (3) that an internal report 
from a consultant said that every contract he reviewed improperly recognized revenue in some way. Id. 
at 183–85. The court held that it was more plausible that the executives were overwhelmed, negligent, 
and had not intentionally created an environment conducive to accounting fraud. Id. at 183, 187–89. 
 17.  See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme Court and the Proper 
Role of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 345, 351–57 (2008); 
Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J. CORP. L. 551, 566–67 (2011). 
 18.  See Seth Aronson et al., Shareholder Derivative Actions: From Cradle to Grave, 1832 
PLI/Corp. 413, 518 (2010); Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Pleading Information and Belief 
After the PSLRA, in SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 16:101 (2d ed. 2010); Ethan D. 
Wohl, Confidential Informants in Private Litigation: Balancing Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure, 
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 551, 556 (2007). 
 19.  552 F.3d 981, 996–1000 (9th Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants capitalized 
internal-software-development expenses (payroll and ordinary expenses) that should have been 
expensed, which caused the company to look more profitable than it really was. Id. at 987–88. To show 
that the company and its executives knowingly and recklessly overestimated earnings, the plaintiffs 
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sources in a complaint,20 but when plaintiffs refuse to disclose their sources, 
federal courts believe this anonymity frustrates the weighing process demanded 
by Tellabs. The use of confidential witnesses is further undermined when courts 
also discount confidential witnesses as being incredible. One appellate court 
assumed that confidential witnesses are incredible,21 and another court even 
allowed defendants to depose confidential witnesses on a motion to dismiss to 
make sure the sources supported the allegations in the complaint.22 
The second way that the erroneous discounting of circumstantial evidence is 
compounded is that, in conducting the weighing process, the federal courts do 
not even analyze evidence. To the contrary, what is weighed at the pleading 
stage is a complaint’s allegations, which are not taken as true, against arguments 
in a defendant’s briefs or briefs filed by amici. 
B. Proving Reliance and Loss Causation by a Preponderance of the Evidence 
at Class Certification 
By aggregating small claims, the class action remedies the practical 
impediment posed by a widespread, de minimis harm. Securities fraud claims 
are uniquely suited to class actions because investors often suffer damages that 
are small relative to the expense of litigation. The courts have rewritten Federal 
Rule 23 to require plaintiffs to prove to a judge the merits of the elements of 
reliance and loss causation by a preponderance of the evidence to obtain class 
certification, a burden at least equal to their burden of proof at trial. 
Class certification for a securities fraud claim is governed by Rule 23 and the 
PSLRA. To warrant class treatment, Rule 23 requires commonality of issues, 
adequacy of representation, numerosity of proposed class members, and 
 
alleged that six confidential witnesses claimed that the CFO eliminated internal controls that prevented 
improperly capitalizing expenses, that the President instructed employees to capitalize payroll 
expenses, and that numerous employees complained about improper accounting. Id. at 992–95. The 
court said that these allegations were not particularized and were insufficient to overcome the inference 
that the defendants had not acted with scienter. Id. at 999–1000. 
 20.  The PSLRA does not require plaintiffs to disclose anonymous sources. See Novak v. Kasaks, 
216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if [confidential] personal sources must be identified, there is 
no requirement they be named, provided that they are described in the complaint with sufficient 
particularity to support the probability that a person in the position occupied by the source would 
possess the information alleged.”). 
 21.  Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 22.  Campo v. Sears Holding, Corp., 635 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The plaintiffs relied 
on confidential witnesses to allege scienter with particularity. Id. at 329. The district court ordered that 
the defendants depose the confidential witnesses, and then the court, when ruling on the motion to 
dismiss, considered only those allegations that were corroborated by later deposition. Id. at 330. The 
court ordered these depositions “for the limited purpose of determining whether the confidential 
witnesses acknowledged the statements attributable to them in the complaint,” and to ensure the 
plaintiff’s attorney’s compliance with Rule 11. Campo v. Sears Holding, Corp., 371 F. App’x 212, 216 
n.4 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished decision). The Second Circuit endorsed this approach on appeal 
because, according to the court, anonymity frustrates Tellabs’s weighing process. Id. This approach not 
only violates the PSLRA’s stay of discovery, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2011), but also the 
federal rules’ requirement that courts refrain from considering material beyond the pleadings on a 
motion to dismiss, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
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typicality of the lead plaintiff’s claim.23 If the class is an “opt out” class, then 
common questions of law and fact must predominate over individualized 
questions and a class action must be superior to alternative methods of 
adjudication.24 The PSLRA imposes additional procedural requirements 
regarding notice and the selection of a lead plaintiff, but otherwise does not 
require increased scrutiny at class certification.25 
The inquiry under Rule 23 is a procedural one: are the questions raised by 
the litigation more efficiently addressed on a class rather than on an individual 
basis? The Supreme Court understood that under Rule 23 the inquiry was 
procedural and judges should not conduct an inquiry into the merits, explaining 
in Eisen v. Carlilse & Jacqueline that neither the language nor the history of 
Rule 23 allowed a court “to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a 
suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”26 
Addressing the merits before trial, the Court observed, would prejudice 
defendants: plaintiffs could get a ruling on the merits of their class claim before 
a decision on whether they were entitled to bring the claim as a class action at 
all, and defendants would have to litigate this merit decision without the 
traditional rules and protections afforded at trial.27 At minimum, the Court said, 
a preliminary judgment on the merits would “color the subsequent 
proceedings.”28 The Court adhered to its prohibition on merits inquiries on a 
Rule 23 motion even in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 
where the Court held that courts should conduct a “rigorous analysis” into 
whether the Rule 23 requirements were met.29 Notably, the Court did not 
require a searching inquiry in every case into the merits, but only if allegations 
 
 23.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 24.  Id. 23(b)(3). Class actions pursuing monetary damages are usually “opt-out” class actions in 
which a class member can leave the class. See David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-
Out Rights, and “Indivisible” Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 542–43 (2011). 
 25.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(a)(2)–(3), (7) (Supp. 2011); see Michael J. Kaufman & John M. 
Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud 
Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 348–50 (2010) (noting the absence of heightened certification 
standards while surveying the PSLRA’s changes to class action procedure). 
 26.  417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). Eisen questioned which party ought to bear the cost of notice. The 
district court held that defendants had to pay if the plaintiff could show a strong likelihood of success 
on the merits. To determine which party should bear the cost of notice, the court assumed that Rule 23 
allowed it to make a preliminary judgments on the merits. The Court, however, said courts should 
refrain from an assessment of the merits on class certification.  
 27.  Id. at 177–78.  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). The “rigorous analysis” formulation  
says nothing at all about how much the plaintiffs must show or prove. When the Falcon Court 
referred to a ‘rigorous analysis,’ it was responding to a line of precedent that liberally allowed 
across-the-board class actions in employment discrimination cases without seriously attending 
to Rule 23’s requirements. But as long as a judge applies Rule 23 carefully, it is not apparent 
why a ‘rigorous analysis’ necessarily requires [the judge] to look beyond the pleadings to 
assess 23(a)(2). 
Robert G. Bone, Sorting Through the Certification Muddle, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 105, 111 
(2010). 
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on the face of the complaint were insufficiently precise.30 
Recently, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court rejected this 
interpretation of Eisen and Falcon, saying that Rule 23 is not “a mere pleading 
standard” and that a rigorous analysis that overlaps with the merits of the claim 
cannot be helped.31 To interpret these cases any other way, the Court said, was a 
mistake.32 Ultimately, the Court held that plaintiffs must prove a common injury 
to satisfy Rule 23’s requirement of commonality and enable a judge to certify a 
common class.33 
Even though Wal-Mart requires plaintiffs to prove a common injury to 
enable class certification, the extent of this holding for securities class actions is 
unclear, particularly in light of the Court’s traditional appreciation for the 
important role of class actions in providing effective remedies for defrauded 
investors and in maintaining the integrity of the securities markets. The Court 
has interpreted substantive elements of securities fraud claims in ways that 
facilitate class actions. For example, the Court adopted an objective approach 
to materiality to make class-wide adjudication possible34 and presumptions of 
reliance—the most important of which is the fraud-on-the-market theory—to 
facilitate a determination that common issues predominate.35 Under Basic, Inc. 
and the fraud-on-the-market theory, district judges can infer that class members 
are not victims of separate wrongs because misrepresentations on an efficient 
market support a legal inference of a single wrong.36 The Basic, Inc. 
presumption rests partly on the efficient market hypothesis, which posits that in 
an open and well-developed market, prices for a security incorporate public 
information, that is, public misstatements.37 Under this theory, if the fraud is 
publicly disseminated and the stock trades on an efficient market, the fraud is 
impounded in the price and investors are presumed to rely upon it. Basic, Inc. 
further clarified the effect of this presumption on class certification, specifying 
in a footnote that the presumption was rebuttable at trial.38 
 
 30.  Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160.  
 31. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
 32.  Id. at 2552 n.6. 
 33.  Id. at 2551–52. 
 34.  See TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1976) (adopting objective test for 
materiality).  
 35.  See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (presuming reliance in an efficient 
secondary market); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972) (presuming 
reliance when fraud by omission is alleged); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1970) 
(presuming reliance for claims under Rule 14a-98). 
 36.  See Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 247. 
 37.  JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 213–14 (10th 
ed. 2007). The fraud-on-the-market theory rests only partly on the efficient market hypothesis because 
to suggest that all investors rely on just the price would be absurd as it would ignore the significant 
number of other investors who rely on brokers or advisers. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic At Twenty: 
Rethinking Fraud On the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 158–59 (2009). The presumption is rather a 
matter of “juristic grace,” presuming reliance because investors should be able to rely on the integrity 
of the stock price. Id. at 160–61. 
 38.  Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 249 n.29; see also In re Micron Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 627, 
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Despite the judiciary’s earlier commitment to facilitating class-wide 
resolution of securities fraud claims, some courts have rewritten Rule 23 to 
require plaintiffs to prove reliance and loss causation. 
1. Proving Reliance 
Some federal courts require plaintiffs to prove reliance on a motion for class 
certification, the same burden they have at trial. The Second and Third Circuits 
have held that for fraud-on-the-market cases, defendants must have an 
opportunity to rebut the presumption of reliance at class certification and left 
open the possibility that defendants could do so by showing a lack of market-
price impact at the time the fraud was revealed.39 The Supreme Court clarified 
in Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co. that price impact at the time the fraud 
is revealed has no bearing on the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, 
but left open the possibility that defendants might still contest a market’s 
efficiency by arguing a lack of price impact at the time of the alleged 
misstatements.40 And Wal-Mart’s language about proving a common injury on 
class certification lends support to this interpretation as well.41 
Even though the burden is on the defendant to rebut the presumption of 
reliance at trial, allowing rebuttal at class certification requires both sides to 
address reliance in detail then.42 This is the same burden plaintiffs are faced with 
at trial.43 To prove a market is efficient, plaintiffs can rely on a number of 
objective factors, including a security’s average weekly trading volume, the 
number of analysts covering a security, the presence of market makers or 
arbitrageurs, the issuer’s eligibility to file Form S-3 with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the stock price’s reaction to unexpected 
information in the past.44 This last factor is often proved with an event study 
that measures a particular stock’s reaction to new information.45 Defendants 
often try to rebut the showing of market efficiency by offering an expert and 
event study that shows the market is inefficient.46 
 
634 (D. Idaho 2007). 
 39.  In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 637–38 (3d Cir. 2011); In re Salomon Analyst 
Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 484–86 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 40.  131 S. Ct. 2178, 2186–87 (2011). 
 41.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–52 (2011). 
 42.  Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 25, at 342–43. 
 43.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2552 n.6; Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 245–47; see, e.g., Model 
Civ. Jury Instr. 9th Cir. 18.5 (2007). 
 44.  See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989). 
 45.  Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of 
Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 380 (2002) (“[E]vent studies provide a metric for 
measurement of the impact upon stock prices of policy decisions.”); Esther Bruegger & Frederick C. 
Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with Response Coefficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 11, 16 (2009) 
(“Event studies are widely used in litigation to measure the effect of alleged misconduct by examining 
the share price impact of relevant disclosures. The event study method is commonly used in securities 
litigation for estimating the share price impact of events because it meets scientific standards.”). 
 46.  See generally MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, EXPERT WITNESSES: SECURITIES CASES § 2.16–2.23 
(2011). 
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To resolve the efficient-market inquiry, plaintiffs have to undertake 
extensive (though not full) discovery, both parties submit competing expert 
reports on the market’s efficiency, and the district court has to resolve the 
debate between the two experts.47 This transforms Rule 23 into a battle of the 
experts when the proper time for this is at trial, where the experts’ testimonies 
and theories can be subject to the rigors of cross-examination; the judge, by 
assigning each opinion weight and deciding between the two, takes on a role 
traditionally reserved to a fact-finding jury.48 
2. Proving Loss Causation 
The Fifth Circuit went even further than the Second and Third Circuits, 
requiring plaintiffs to also establish loss causation on a motion for class 
certification. The Fifth Circuit held in Oscar Private Equity Investments v. 
Allegiance Telecom, Inc. (and in a few other cases) that before plaintiffs can 
invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, plaintiffs must 
establish loss causation by a preponderance of the evidence on a Rule 23 
motion.49 The Supreme Court recognized in Erica that this requirement was far 
afield from its decision in Basic, Inc. and held that plaintiffs do not have to 
prove loss causation before invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
reliance at class certification.50 
To best understand loss causation and its role at class certification, we must 
turn to the PSLRA and Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.51 The PSLRA 
requires plaintiffs to plead that the defendant’s act caused “the loss for which 
the plaintiff seeks to recover damages,” colloquially known as loss causation.52 
Generally, the PSLRA allows investors to recover for inflationary loss so long 
as investors define their precise losses and establish the causal link.53 Thus, 
plaintiffs could state a claim under Rule 10b-5 by alleging inflationary loss—
first, stating that they seek to recover inflationary damages, and then alleging 
that the inflation was caused by the defendant’s fraud.54 In Dura, the Supreme 
Court held that plaintiffs could not state a claim for securities fraud by alleging 
inflationary loss alone; rather, plaintiffs had to allege “economic loss.”55 The 
 
 47.  Steig D. Olson, “Chipping Away”: The Misguided Trend Toward Resolving Merits Disputes as 
Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935, 964 (2009). 
 48.  See, e.g., Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) (stating that the jury, not the 
court, “weighs contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses”). 
 49.  487 F.3d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. 
Halliburton, Co., 597 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2010); Fener v. Operating Eng’rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. 
Pension Fund (LOCAL 66), 579 F.3d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 2009); Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve 
Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 227-28 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 50.  Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011). 
 51.  544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 52.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(4) (Supp. 2011). 
 53.  Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 6–7 (2005). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Dura, 544 U.S. at 338, 342–43, 345. 
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Court’s decision was, as one author of this article put it, “inconsistent . . . , 
incoherent . . . , [and] incomplete.”56 The novel concept of economic loss lent 
itself to two different interpretations: (1) to plead and show loss causation, 
plaintiffs have to allege a specific loss and then a causal link connecting the loss 
to the defendant’s fraud; or (2) to plead and show loss causation, plaintiffs have 
to establish a “lie-truth-drop” scenario, which required defendants to publicly 
lie, publicly correct the lie (a “corrective disclosure”), and then show the stock 
price dropped as a result of the correction (a “post-transaction decline”).57 
Some federal courts have narrowly interpreted Dura to mean that plaintiffs 
must plead the “lie-truth-drop”; others have focused on only the identification 
of a corrective disclosure and an expert tying that corrective disclosure to a 
drop in stock price in their analysis of loss causation.58 This has resulted in a 
noticeable decline in cases being filed that lack the “lie-truth-drop” formula.59 
The federal courts further compounded the problematic, narrow reading of 
Dura by requiring plaintiffs to prove on a Rule 23 motion without full discovery 
that other factors did not cause the loss for which plaintiffs seek to recover. In 
Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecome, Inc., the court was 
confronted with whether the plaintiffs had adequately shown loss causation and 
reliance when the correction of the fraud on the market was commingled with 
the revelation of other bad news that moved the stock price downward.60 The 
plaintiffs offered an expert who opined that with an event study, the expert 
could later (after merits discovery) quantify the portion of the price drop 
proximately caused by the company’s fraud.61 But, the Fifth Circuit said, the 
plaintiffs had to show loss causation at class certification, not trial, and to show 
loss causation the plaintiffs had to isolate the effect of the fraud on the stock 
price from other effects with an event study.62 
Using loss causation as a precondition to class certification is problematic in 
 
 56.  Kaufman, supra note 53, at 1. 
 57.  Madge S. Thorsen et al., Rediscovering the Economics of Loss Causation, 6 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 
93, 117–19 (2006). 
 58.  Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 
825 (2009) (stating that “[a]lthough Dura did not explicitly require a corrective disclosure, the loss 
causation analysis in most cases has focused on both the identification of an adequate corrective 
disclosure and expert testimony tying that corrective disclosure to a drop in stock price”); James C. 
Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs To Lie More After Dura Pharmaceuticals, 95 GEO. L.J. 
653, 666, 671 n.111 (2007) (collecting cases and finding that courts require plaintiffs to show a market 
decline (ex post loss)). 
 59.  Scotland M. Duncan, Dura’s Effect on Securities Class Actions, 27 J.L. & COM. 137, 167 (2008) 
(empirical study that Dura has resulted in the avoidance of cases lacking market corroboration in the 
form of a price decline). 
 60.  Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom., Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 263, 266, 270 (5th Cir. 
2007). The company corrected misstatements about the amount of installed telecommunications lines at 
the same time the firm released bad news about business prospects, including that it missed analysts’ 
earnings expectations, had greater than expected earnings losses, and had a thin margin of error for 
meeting revenue covenants. Id. at 263. 
 61.  Id. at 270. 
 62.  Id. 
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two respects. First, it denies plaintiffs the presumption of reliance in fraud-on-
the-market cases. Before plaintiffs can show loss causation (that fraud caused a 
cognizable loss to investors), they must show that the fraud was impounded in 
the stock price. Yet whether the fraud is impounded in the stock price is 
precisely what is presumed under Basic, Inc. Ergo, requiring loss causation as a 
precondition to the fraud-on-the-market theory muddies two distinct inquiries: 
(1) whether the defendant’s fraud inflated the purchase price; and (2) whether 
that inflation dissipated in some way such that investors could not recover the 
inflationary loss. Only the former is required for class certification, and this is 
what the Supreme Court recognized in Erica.63 Second, loss causation—whether 
the inflation dissipated in a way that investors could not recover it—is a 
question common to all class members; there can be no individual issues of loss 
causation.64 Moreover, that all investors may not be able to establish loss 
causation is not justification for denying class treatment as plaintiffs need not 
prevail on the merits to receive class treatment.65 A fatal similarity to all class 
members is best dealt with on summary judgment,66 which would end the 
litigation, whereas denying a Rule 23 motion would just result in individual 
lawsuits. 
Oscar also illustrates the dispositive role that event studies now play in 
securities fraud pre-trial litigation. The federal courts require plaintiffs to offer 
event studies that isolate the effect of the defendant’s fraud from other factors 
that may have affected the company’s stock price.67 An event study is an 
empirical technique that is used to measure a specific event’s impact on stock 
price, and in this regard has been used to show market efficiency (and thus 
reliance), materiality, damages, and causation.68 Event studies are so useful, that 
without one, a plaintiff often never reaches a jury.69 But requiring event studies 
to isolate fraud from other factors puts too much faith in these methods of 
evidence. To illustrate: in Fener v. Belo Corp.,70 the plaintiffs sued a media 
company, alleging that it had inflated the circulation numbers of one of its 
newspapers.71 When, in a press release, the company revealed its fraud along 
 
 63.  Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011). 
 64.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Litigation: The Year Ahead, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 20, 2011.  
 65.  Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 66.  See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
97, 107 (2009).  
 67.  Fisch, supra note 58, at 825.  
 68.  William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of 
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 874–79 (2005).  
 69.  See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom., Inc., 487 F.3d at 271; Freeland v. 
Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 81 (D.D.C. 2008); In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. 
Supp. 2d 1195, 1274 (N.D. Okla. 2007). Courts have coyly tempered the event-study requirement, 
recognizing that expert testimony, though not required, is undoubtedly “helpful.” See, e.g., Wortley v. 
Camplin, 333 F.3d 284, 296–97 (1st Cir. 2003); In re Netbank, Inc. Sec. Litig., 259 F.R.D. 656, 673 n.9 
(N.D. Ga. 2009).  
 70.  560 F. Supp. 2d 502 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
 71.  Fener v. Operating Eng’rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund (LOCAL 66), 579 F.3d 401, 
404–05 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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with other “methodological” business problems, the stock price dropped.72 
According to the facts as stated by the court, the plaintiffs did not come armed 
with an expert or event study to show that the stock price dropped because of 
the fraud.73 The defendants did offer an expert, however, who separated the 
press release into disclosures about the fraud and revelations of other bad news 
and concluded that the drop in price was not attributable to disclosure of the 
fraud. The plaintiffs responded with an expert of their own who, according to 
the court, argued that the press release should be treated as one corrective 
disclosure.74 Because the plaintiffs’ expert did not separate the revelation of the 
fraud from the other bad news, the Fifth Circuit rejected the testimony out of 
hand, saying that without positive proof in the form of an event study, the 
plaintiffs had not shown reliance.75 
The courts that require plaintiffs to establish (or rebut) loss causation on a 
Rule 23 motion accord talismanic significance to expert testimony and an event 
study’s ability to isolate the effect of the fraud. Expert testimony and event 
studies have long been a hallmark of securities fraud litigation, a trend that is 
unlikely to change so long as financial markets and investment vehicles grow in 
number and complexity. An additional byproduct of pushing the merits 
resolution up to the class certification decision and requiring a reliable event 
study, federal courts conduct at least a limited Daubert analysis of experts at the 
Rule 23 stage.76 
The Seventh Circuit has recognized the trouble with altering the inquiry 
under Rule 23 to that of a merits-based analysis on reliance and loss causation 
(the Supreme Court recognized this only implicitly and to a limited extent in 
Erica77). In Schleicher v. Wendt, the defendants argued that before certifying a 
class and using the fraud-on-the-market theory, the district judge had to 
determine that the contested statements actually caused material changes in 
stock prices.78 The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument on several grounds.79 
 
 72.  Id. at 405. 
 73.  Id. at 408. 
 74.  Id. at 408–09. Contrary to the representations by the court, it appears that the plaintiffs did 
allege that the purportedly unrelated methodological business problems were part of the fraud. 
Complaint at ¶¶ 50–53, Fener v. Belo, 560 F. Supp. 2d 502 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (No. 3:04-CV-1836-D), 
2004 WL 2657127. What’s more, the plaintiff’s expert did isolate the other bad news from the fraud, 
opining that the unrelated bad news had already been disclosed to the public and already incorporated 
into the stock price before the company released news of the fraud. Declaration of Scott D. Hakala, 
PH.D, CFA Regarding Market Efficiency and Loss Causation, at ¶ 30; Fener, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 502, 
2007 WL 4470898. The plaintiffs’ expert continued that even assuming the unrelated information was 
news to the public, it accounted for only half of the stock price decline. Id. 
 75.  Fener, 579 F.3d at 410–11. 
 76.  See, e.g., Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815–16, (7th Cir. 2010). The Supreme 
Court left this question open in Wal-Mart, but the Court’s discussion suggests that it would favor a full 
Daubert inquiry on Rule 23. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553–54 (2011). 
 77.  See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011).  
 78.  618 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2010).  
 79.  The Second and Third Circuits have rejected Oscar’s loss-causation requirement as well. In re 
DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 637–38 (3d Cir. 2011); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 
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First, the court rejected the notion that the district judge had to determine 
whether the fraud caused a “material” change in stock price on a Rule 23 
motion.80 Whether the fraud was material was a merits question common to all 
plaintiffs.81 Further, the court continued, plaintiffs did not have to show that 
they would prevail on the merits to obtain class treatment, and thus the court 
could certify the class even if the fraud had only a trivial effect on the stock 
price.82 Second, the Seventh Circuit (and the Supreme Court later in Erica) 
rejected Oscar because it required plaintiffs to establish their case at class 
certification contrary to Basic, Inc.83 According to the Seventh Circuit, neither 
Rule 23, Eisen, nor Basic, Inc. allows for a full-blown merits inquiry, but only a 
“peek at the merits” to determine if class certification is proper.84 Notably, the 
Seventh Circuit refused to rewrite Rule 23 to make success on the merits a 
prerequisite to class certification in securities fraud claims, even despite 
defendants’ concerns that class certification creates pressure to settle.85 
C. Proving Loss Causation Again on a Motion for Summary Judgment 
The federal courts have converted summary judgment into a factual 
determination of not just the reliability, but also the credibility of the plaintiffs’ 
expert on issues of damages and loss causation.86 Loss causation mirrors 
proximate cause at common law.87 Thus, like proximate cause, loss causation is a 
quintessential fact question in part because it necessarily involves some 
inferential reasoning.88 Whether the defendant’s conduct caused anything is a 
hypothetical question: what would have happened if the defendant had told the 
truth? If a jury determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
plaintiffs would not have suffered their economic losses had the defendant told 
the truth, then the jury may not find loss causation. At trial, plaintiffs must 
prove that the defendant’s fraud caused their losses (loss causation) by a 
preponderance of the evidence.89 But whether some other factor caused a 
decline in the stock price or broke the causal chain is in the nature of a defense 
 
F.3d 474, 483–84 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 80.  Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 81.  Id. at 685. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186–86 (2011); Schleicher, 618 
F.3d at 687. 
 84.  Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 685–86. 
 85.  Id. at 686.  
 86.  Professor Arthur Miller made a similar point years earlier using In re Software Toolworks, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 789 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1992), to show that judges use summary judgment to decide 
securities fraud cases that should go to a jury. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the 
“Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury 
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1095–1126 (2003). 
 87.  E.g., Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 683–84 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 88.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328C; BCS Servs., Inc. v. Heartwood 88, LLC, 
637 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 89.  See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345–46 (2005). 
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to the plaintiffs’ claim.90 Defendants may present evidence of intervening 
causes, and if at trial the defendants do present an intervening-cause defense, 
then the plaintiffs are permitted to try to rebut that defense. And even though 
plaintiffs always have the burden of persuasion at trial, they need not rebut any 
evidence of intervening cause until the defendant first presents that evidence. 
Loss causation is also often the subject of expert testimony. To admit expert 
testimony, district judges must ensure expert testimony is reliable, but this 
should not be confused with whether the evidence is ultimately believable. 
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which codified the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,91 an expert witness 
can offer testimony if: (1) the expert is qualified; (2) the expert’s testimony will 
assist the trier of fact; and (3) the expert’s testimony is based on reliable 
principles and methods.92 As a result of Daubert, parties challenge the 
admissibility of evidence more frequently, and judges scrutinize evidence more 
carefully and exclude a greater proportion of it.93 The danger, according to 
Professor Paul Carrington, is that Daubert rewrote the Federal Rules of 
Evidence “to weaken and perhaps nullify federal laws dependent on their 
enforcement on the use of expert opinion,” such as the private right of action 
for securities fraud, by allowing district judges “to exclude expert testimony 
that, on the basis of their personal scientific expertise, they deem unreliable.”94 
In securities litigation, where motions in limine to exclude expert testimony 
and motions for summary judgment go hand in hand, a district judge can easily 
march through the merits of the case under the guise of a credibility analysis.95 
Plaintiffs must not only present a qualified and reliable expert to provide 
opinion evidence on loss causation, they must also convince the judge that their 
 
 90.  See, e.g., 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 223 (2011); BCS Servs., Inc., 637 F.3d at 757 (“The plaintiff 
doesn’t have to . . . offer evidence which positively excludes every other possible cause of the accident. . 
. . [T]he burden of proving an ‘intervening cause’—something which snaps the ‘causal chain’ (that is, 
operates as a ‘superseding cause,’ wiping out the defendant's liability, . . . that connects the wrongful act 
to the defendant’s injury—is on the defendant.”)) (internal citations omitted); Freeland v. Iridium 
World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 80 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Loss causation is an affirmative defense 
and the risk of nonpersuasion is on [the defendant], not Plaintiffs.”); In re Micron Techs., Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 247 F.R.D. 627, 634–35 (D. Idaho 2007) (stating that defendant bears the burden to sever the link 
in the causal chain after plaintiffs show loss causation). 
 91.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–95 (1993); FED. R. EVID. 702, 
advisory committee note; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 7:7 (3d ed. 2010). 
 92.  FED. R. EVID. 702.  
 93.  A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What Empirical Studies Tell Us About 
the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 109–10 (2005) (summarizing empirical studies on 
Daubert). 
 94.  Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 
DUKE L.J. 597, 662–63 (2010). Daubert’s discretion afforded to district judges is compounded by 
deferential abuse-of-discretion review by appellate courts. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 
138–39 (1997). 
 95.  See Carrington, supra note 94, at 662–63 (observing that the discretion entrusted to district 
judges to determine reliability “has contributed measurably to the rise in summary judgments 
dismissing plaintiffs’ cases”). 
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expert is more believable than the defendant’s on a motion for summary 
judgment. 
In re Williams Securities Litigation96 illustrates this point. In Williams, 
investors sued claiming that the company had committed fraud when it painted 
a rosy picture of the prospects of a subsidiary spin-off, when in fact, the 
subsidiary was spun-off because its future was in doubt.97 To show loss 
causation, the plaintiffs’ expert developed two scenarios: (1) no single 
disclosure resulted in the market learning about the fraud, but disclosure of the 
truth occurred gradually (leaking out); or (2) four different disclosures revealed 
the misstated information.98 
The Tenth Circuit rejected both of the expert’s theories, but as Professor J. 
Robert Brown, Jr. observes, its analysis shows that plaintiffs will find 
maintaining a merited suit almost impossible.99 First, the court rejected the 
expert’s leakage theory (a theory apart from the “lie-truth-drop” formula). The 
court dismissed the entire “1300 page compendium of news articles, reports, and 
SEC filings” the expert pointed to as evidence of a gradual revelation of the 
fraud as news, concluding that it was “generally applicable to the . . . industry as 
a whole, or was an upbeat rather than negative statement.”100 Yet the court did 
not offer any examples to support its analysis. Then the court incoherently 
claimed that although a leakage theory was permissible to show loss causation, 
plaintiffs and their expert had to identify a specific event and a specific drop in 
share prices—the “lie-truth-drop” formula.101 The problem, as Professor Brown 
notes, is that 
the notion of leakage is built around gradual disclosure, gradual revelation. The 
market may know at some point that the earlier, optimistic statements were not 
entirely true, but for the truth to be fully reflected in share prices, the market must 
know the extent to which the false statements misrepresented the company’s capital 
position.
102
 
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the expert’s reliance on four different corrective 
disclosures.103 The court’s reason: the truth already leaked to the market.104 The 
 
 96.  558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 97.  Id. at 1133–34. 
 98.  Id. at 1134–36.  
 99.  J. Robert Brown, Jr., Using Loss Causation to Repeal Rule 10b-5: In re Williams Securities 
Litigation (Part 5), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Mar. 24, 2009, 6:00 AM), http:// 
www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-issues/using-loss-causation-to-repeal-rule-10b-5-in-re-williams-
sec-3.html. 
 100.  Williams, 558 F.3d at 1138 (emphasis added). 
 101.  See id. (“While the truth could be revealed by the actual materialization of the concealed risk 
rather than by a public disclosure that the risk exists, any theory of loss causation would still have to 
identify when the materialization occurred and link it to a corresponding loss.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 102.  J. Robert Brown, Jr., Using Loss Causation to Repeal Rule 10b-5: In re Williams Securities 
Litigation (Part 4), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Mar. 23, 2009, 6:07 AM), http:// 
www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-issues/using-loss-causation-to-repeal-rule-10b-5-in-re-williams-
sec-4.html. 
 103.  Williams, 558 F.3d at 1143. 
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court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that the disclosures corrected the fraud 
because the market already knew of the fraud.105 
Why then did the court reject the leakage theory? The crux of the court’s 
problem was that, in the court’s opinion, the event study by the plaintiffs’ expert 
was unreliable because the expert did not rule out other factors’ effect on the 
stock price.106 Yet event studies are notoriously ineffective at separating out the 
amount of a decline in stock price where multiple disclosures or multiple 
misrepresentations are made.107 And to the extent “other factors” explain the 
drop in the company’s stock price, this is a matter for cross-examination at 
trial.108 In cases with dueling experts, such as Williams, the jury should 
determine which expert, if any, to believe. 
III 
JUDICIAL ACCESS BARRIERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
The access barriers erected at the pleading, class certification, and summary 
judgment stages of securities litigation pose both constitutional and practical 
concerns. First, by rewriting109 rules of procedure rather than deferring to 
traditional rulemaking bodies like Congress and the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference, the judiciary has usurped the rulemaking 
function of the legislature. By rewriting Rule 23 and Rule 56, the judiciary has 
shown a disregard for the congressional rulemaking process and bucked the 
historical trend away from unilateral judicial decision-making toward a process 
that includes multiple gatekeepers. The dangers of shying away from the formal 
rulemaking process have been well catalogued.110 We only highlight that 
neglecting the rulemaking process sacrifices balanced and transparent, 
informed, and cohesive rulemaking. 
Second, the pre-trial barriers encroach on the province of the jury by 
requiring plaintiffs to meet, or at times even exceed, the burden of proof they 
will have at trial and leaving district courts with considerable fact-finding 
power. Requiring plaintiffs to satisfy pre-trial burdens of proof usually greater 
than their ultimate burden at trial may also infringe on the Seventh 
Amendment right to a trial by jury. The Seventh Amendment “preserves” our 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 1138–39. 
 107.  See, e.g., Bruegger & Dunbar, supra note 45, at 25–26; Fisher, supra note 68, at 874–79; 
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of Event 
Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 231–33 (2009). 
 108.  See supra note 90.  
 109.  Although the difference between interpreting and “rewriting” a Rule is one of degree, 
Professor Stephen Burbank pointed out that “here the degrees of separation approach one hundred 
and eighty.” Mark Herrmann et al., Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal? 
158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 161 (2009). 
 110.  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A 
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010).  
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right to a trial by jury in civil cases as that right existed in the common law in 
1791,111 ensuring the jury’s status as a constitutional actor.112 In the context of 
pre-trial screening, the Supreme Court suggested in Tellabs that so long as the 
plaintiffs’ burden is not greater than the burden of proof at trial, then the 
Seventh Amendment is not violated.113 The Court also implicitly endorsed this 
interpretation in Wal-Mart, when it recognized that the burden on Rule 23 was 
the same as the burden at trial.114 However, the new pleading, class certification, 
and summary judgment standards significantly infringe on plaintiffs’ right to a 
trial by jury. 
A. Pleading Securities Fraud and the Seventh Amendment 
Tellabs provides room for district courts to apply a burden of proof greater 
than the burden at trial. In Tellabs, the Court was forced to confront the 
Seventh Amendment implications of merit-based pre-trial screening.115 In a 
remarkably sweeping statement, the Court dismissed the Seventh Amendment 
argument and said that when the judiciary exercises a screening function—when 
considering a motion to dismiss, admitting expert testimony, making a judgment 
as a matter of law, or entering summary judgment—the Seventh Amendment is 
not implicated.116 According to the Court, Congress, as creator of federal claims, 
 
 111.  U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155–56 (1973). 
 112.  The jury’s status as a constitutional actor is different from that of the three branches of 
government or of the states in that its status and strength is wholly dependent on the judiciary. Suja A. 
Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 791 (2005). Thus, at a minimum, 
judicial modesty in questions concerning the scope of the jury’s power is warranted. Id. at 792–93. 
 113.  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007) (“We emphasize, as 
well, that under our construction of the ‘strong inference’ standard, a plaintiff is not forced to plead 
more than she would be required to prove at trial.”). Professor Suja A. Thomas has argued persuasively 
that the core principle of the substance of the common-law jury trial is that a court never decides issues 
without a determination of the facts by the parties (as through an admission) or by the jury, however 
improbable the evidence might be; rather, a jury decides a case with any evidence, however 
improbable, unless the moving party admitted the facts or conclusions of the nonmoving party. Suja A. 
Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 147–48 (2007). Under this 
formulation, she and other scholars have argued that many judicial access barriers infringe on the 
Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. See Allan Horwich & Sean Siekkinen, Pleading Reform or 
Unconstitutional Encroachment? An Analysis of the Seventh Amendment Implications of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 35 SEC. REG. L.J. 4, 9–10 (2007); Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v.Iqbal 
Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 287 (2009); Miller, 
supra note 86, at 1064; Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 1851, 1873 (2008). But the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs makes clear that the Court does 
not agree with Thomas’s approach. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 328. Yet even under Tellabs, the access 
barriers in securities litigation pose Seventh Amendment questions. 
 114.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2252 n.6 (2011) (“To invoke [the fraud-on-the-
market presumption], the plaintiffs seeking 23(b)(3) certification must prove that their shares were 
traded on an efficient market, an issue they will surely have to prove again at trial in order to make out 
their case.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 115.  See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 317. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), one 
of the Court’s seminal summary-judgment cases, the Court recognized that weighing inferences is the 
jury’s domain. Id. at 255. However, this is exactly what Tellabs demands of district judges. See Tellabs, 
551 U.S. at 323–24.  
 116.  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326–27, 327 n.8. 
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may set barriers to the courts, and the judiciary simply exercises its 
constitutionally permissible gate-keeping function by weighing inferences.117 
The problem with this reasoning, as best put by Professor Joshua Davis and 
Eric Cramer, is that although the legislature has “the power to change a 
substantive legal right, the Seventh Amendment restricts how those rights may 
be adjudicated in federal court; in other words, Congress’s power to eliminate a 
right is not tantamount to power to control the jury’s role in assessing those 
rights.”118 Indeed, the Seventh Amendment explicitly limits Congress’s power by 
mandating a jury trial right for any claim of damages, which, absent a 
Constitutional amendment, Congress cannot change.119 Thus, contrary to what 
the Supreme Court said in Tellabs, Congress cannot use the subterfuge of 
pleading to allow a judge to make factual determinations that would otherwise 
be constitutionally required to be resolved by a jury. 
And in Tellabs, the Court itself seemed to recognize how sweeping its 
statement regarding judicial gatekeeping and the Seventh Amendment was 
when, to mitigate any Seventh Amendment concern, the Court “emphasized” 
that the burden of pleading was not greater than the burden of proof at trial.120 
According to the Court, its new pleading standard survived a Seventh 
Amendment challenge because the standard did not require plaintiffs to exceed 
the preponderance-of-evidence burden of proof at trial. Yet, Tellabs (without 
so stating) provides room for district judges to require plaintiffs to plead direct 
evidence of scienter to survive a motion to dismiss. By steeply discounting 
circumstantial evidence of scienter as implausible in light of nearly any other 
non-culpable explanation, courts require plaintiffs to allege direct evidence of 
the defendant’s state of mind in order to adequately allege scienter. But this 
burden is greater than plaintiffs’ burden of proof at trial. 
B. Certifying a Securities Fraud Class Action and the Seventh Amendment 
Merits-based class certification is also in tension with the Seventh 
Amendment. In Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp.,121 the Fifth 
Circuit was forced to confront the Seventh Amendment problem that merits-
based class certification poses.122 The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning supporting its 
rejection of any Seventh Amendment problem leaves much to be desired, 
however. The court dismissed any resolution of the merits on class certification 
as a “coincidental” overlap with the fact-finder’s ultimate decision,123 even 
 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of Procedure, 
17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969, 1018 (2010). 
 119.  Suja A. Thomas, A Limitation on Congress: “In Suits at Common Law”, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1071, 
1071 (2010). 
 120.  See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 328. 
 121.  572 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam with former Justice O’Connor sitting by special 
designation). 
 122.  Id. at 228. 
 123.  Id. at 229. 
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though the court acknowledged that the issue on class certification and the 
merits inquiry are “practically identical.”124 The court pointed to the fact that a 
district court could revisit the decision whether to certify a class to support its 
conclusion that a judge’s determination would not interfere with a jury’s.125 
The court’s reasoning is problematic in two respects: First, requiring a 
showing of loss causation on class certification turns the presumption of reliance 
on its head, refusing to infer reliance until plaintiffs show reliance. This is 
inconsistent with Basic, Inc., as the Court explained in Erica.126 Second, there is, 
in fact, a risk of preclusive effect being given to the district judge’s decision on 
class certification, which can be dangerous for plaintiffs and defendants. As a 
general matter, non-final judicial findings, such as a ruling on class certification, 
are entitled to preclusive effect.127 There is no doubt that at class certification, 
district judges are finding facts, including whether plaintiffs have shown reliance 
and loss causation. But the jury is supposed to determine facts and which 
reliable expert (if any) to believe. And more precisely, Supreme Court 
precedent demands that the jury determines facts for class certification before 
the district judge. A class action is essentially an equitable tool.128 The Court, in 
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, long ago 
settled who was entitled to decide merits questions first when the same facts 
were relevant to rights at law (jury) and rights at equity (judge): the jury.129 In 
those cases, the Court held that in cases that combine legal and equitable issues 
the jury makes its findings first, and the judge is then bound by the jury’s factual 
findings.130 The Court explicitly considered the inverse—having the judge first 
render his factual determinations and then binding the jury with the judge’s 
assessment—but the Court rejected that approach as inconsistent with the 
Seventh Amendment’s guarantee to trial by jury.131 
The Fifth Circuit in Flowserve tried to remedy the res-judicata conundrum, 
stating that a decision on class certification does not bind the jury.132 Yet why 
the district judge’s decision on the merits does not act as issue preclusion or law 
of the case is unclear. In In re Bridgestone, the Seventh Circuit correctly noted 
that issue preclusion does not depend on a final judgment, and thus a district 
 
 124.  Id. at 233. 
 125.  Id. at 228–29. 
 126.  Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011). 
 127.  In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liability Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13). 
 128.  Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 
(1940)). 
 129.  Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 25, at 357–60; see also Davis & Cramer, supra note 118, at 
1010–11. 
 130.  Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 
U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959). 
 131.  Beacon Theatres, Inc., 359 U.S. at 510–11. 
 132.  Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 228–29 (5th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations 
From Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 340 (2011). 
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court’s finding on class certification could be used to prevent a party from 
relitigating whether certification was appropriate.133 Thus, the district judge’s 
merit-based decision can preclude at least later class-certification inquiries. 
More problematic is whether the district judge’s decision will act as law of the 
case.134 If a district judge concludes that plaintiffs have not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s fraud caused an actionable 
loss and thus denies class certification, then there is no reason why this finding 
would not bind individual plaintiffs in their individual suits against the 
defendant—the case has not changed. The law-of-the-case doctrine might also 
preclude defendants from relitigating an issue. If the district judge concludes, 
for example, that the plaintiffs have shown loss causation on class certification, 
then this finding might serve to bind the trier of fact. It makes no sense to try a 
case twice. This commonsense principle is embodied in the Seventh 
Amendment’s Reexamination Clause, which allocates authority to review 
verdicts so that litigants will not be forced to succeed on the same issues again 
and again.135 
In Beacon, the Supreme Court did leave a small loophole in the rule that a 
jury must decide facts common to legal and equitable issues, by stating that 
judges may find facts in deciding equitable relief before a jury “under the most 
imperative circumstances.”136 The Court has never defined this phrase though, 
and the most reputable treatise on federal procedure says that whether “any 
circumstances” would qualify is “highly doubtful.”137 As Part IV shows, not only 
are these access barriers unconstitutional, but no “imperative circumstances” 
warrant an intrusion on the Seventh Amendment. 
C. Expert Testimony and the Seventh Amendment 
Judicial scrutiny of expert testimony at class certification and summary 
judgment also creates Seventh Amendment problems. First, it delegates the 
assessment of an expert’s credibility to the district judge, requiring plaintiffs to 
convince a judge of the credibility of their expert and weight of their evidence 
to get to trial. Although federal judges may perform a gatekeeping role in 
 
 133.  In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2003); see 
also Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2011); Thorogood 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 853 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 134.  This has not been the subject of much study. The Chief Justice raised this concern at oral 
argument in Halliburton. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40–41, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton 
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (No. 09-1403). Professor Kevin M. Clermont undertakes the first serious 
attempt at crafting a framework for intra-suit preclusion. Clermont, supra note 132, at 332–40. Based on 
a court’s ability to resolve factual questions to determine subject-matter jurisdiction, he concludes there 
is no problem with law of the case. Id. at 342–43. Yet when a court decides whether there is subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court does not decide whether the plaintiff should win on the merits of the 
claim. Davis & Cramer, supra note 118, at 1013. 
 135.  Davis & Cramer, supra note 118, at 1012. 
 136.  Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959). 
 137.  9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2338 (3d ed. 
2008). 
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screening unqualified and unreliable experts, they may not assess the credibility 
of witnesses, weigh competing evidence, or draw legitimate inferences—the 
Court made these limits clear in Daubert and its summary judgment trilogy.138 
Those are core jury functions, particularly on factual questions such as 
causation and damages.139 But decisions like Williams appear to allow judges to 
exercise these functions.140 
Second, although the plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, the plaintiff 
can meet that burden of proving causation and damages with evidence in forms 
other than scientific evidence or an event study. Courts implicitly have adopted 
the view that event studies present an objective method of establishing that, in 
all cases, reasonable minds cannot differ on the issue of causation. Causation, 
however, asks whether an act was the cause of an outcome, which requires 
asking the hypothetical question whether an outcome would have occurred 
without an act’s having taken place—an inference drawn from experience and 
understanding.141 Expert testimony and event studies provide experience and 
understanding that help a fact-finder assess the causal question, but cannot be 
considered completely objective evidence of causation precisely because 
causation requires answering a hypothetical question. Experts are subject to 
their own value judgments and preexisting biases that may affect their view of a 
body of evidence and, as we explain below, there are many opportunities for 
experts to massage an “objective” study. Cross-examination and counter-proof 
are used to determine which expert’s testimony, if any, is ultimately correct.142 
IV 
THE ACCESS BARRIERS ARE UNWISE, UNFOUNDED, AND INJURIOUS 
The judicial access barriers rest on three premises that are incomplete, 
unsupported, or false, including the contentions that defendants settle claims in 
terrorem, that Congress is incapable of fashioning rules responsive to litigation 
concerns and the jury is incapable of merited fact-finding, and that merits-based 
screening precludes only “frivolous” litigation. 
 
 138.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596–97 (1993); Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. 
Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 139.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328C (1965). 
 140.  In re Williams Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 141.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 28 cmt. on subsection a, (c) 
(2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. (b) (1965) (“[C]ausation is incapable of 
mathematical proof, since no man can say with absolute certainty what would have occurred if the 
defendant had acted otherwise.”); Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact 
Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1156–57 (2003) (stating that causation and 
proximate cause require probabilistic inferences about hypothetical conditions); Glanville Williams, 
Causation in the Law, 1961 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 62, 70 n.22 (“[H]ypothesis and speculation are essential 
for determining causal connection, since every statement of causal connection asserts what would have 
happened if the facts had been different.”).  
 142.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 7:10 (3d ed. 2010). 
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A. The Incomplete and Unsupported Contention that Defendants Settle 
Claims In Terrorem 
Many of the judicial access barriers to remedies for securities fraud are 
premised on the following “in terrorem settlement” rationale: Heightened 
access barriers are necessary to reduce the threat of litigation costs, which 
forces defendants to settle claims based on the in terrorem effect of these 
expenses rather than the merits.143 These costs are arguably incurred by an 
exceptionally high rate of frivolous securities fraud claims, abusive discovery, 
the hydraulic pressure of class certification, and the prospect of an irrational 
jury rendering a catastrophic verdict. We show, however, that this multi-layered 
assumption is unsupported and incomplete and that judicial access barriers may 
actually increase litigation costs. 
1. The Unsupported and Incomplete Multi-Layered Assumption 
The argument that securities litigation is particularly frivolous is 
unsupported.144 As a starting point, to state that a claim is “frivolous” when no 
merits have been disclosed via discovery is an untestable (and thus 
unrebuttable) assertion.145 Absent an argument that contravenes black-letter 
law, how do we know a claim is frivolous without discovery? Some point to 
small settlements as evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys file claims that are simply 
too expensive to defend. But just as small settlements may suggest that the case 
was too costly to defend against, so too may it suggest that the small damages in 
the case did not justify much effort on the plaintiff’s side.146 That neither side 
wanted to invest much effort in the case does not make it inherently frivolous or 
meritless. 
Further, to the extent some attorneys knowingly file meritless claims for the 
purpose of extorting a settlement, safeguards already exist in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the PSLRA. 
These rules require in some form a reasonable inquiry and factual support for 
 
 143.  See, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347–48 (2005); Oscar Private Equity Invs. 
v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 144.  See, e.g., Lance P. McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement “Problem”: The Elusive Truth and a 
Clarifying Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 221, 227 (2007) (“Is nuisance litigation really the 
problem it is made out to be? Does the rhetoric match the reality? From an empirical standpoint, the 
consensus among scholars is that the answer to these questions is clearly no. The proof is simply not 
there.”). 
 145.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence 
and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 n.5 (2006) (stating that a “strike suit” is a myth 
“like the unicorn, more discussed than directly observed”); Brian D. Hufford, Deterring Fraud vs. 
Avoiding the “Strike Suit”: Reaching an Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 593, 633 (1995) 
(finding evidence that the merit of a securities fraud claims has substantial bearing on settlement); Suja 
A. Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 633, 634 (2010) (stating there is no working definition 
for “frivolous”). 
 146.  Coffee, Jr., supra note 145, at 1536 n.5. Similarly, professors James Cox, Randall Thomas, and 
Lynn Bai find that cases involving smaller settlements have significantly smaller provable losses. James 
Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class 
Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 383–84 (2008). 
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all allegations in a complaint.147 The prospect of sanctions and costs to 
reputation make fabrication by attorneys not only unethical, but also costly.148 
And, at the very least, filing a meritless case leaves plaintiffs with no credible 
leverage when negotiating settlement.149 
We now turn to the claim that abusive litigation costs—namely abusive 
discovery—force defendants to settle. Similar to the contention that securities 
litigation is “frivolous,” the contention that discovery is “abusive” is 
problematic because the judiciary lacks a working definition of “abusive 
discovery,” without which we cannot differentiate abusive discovery from 
appropriate discovery.150 Yet even assuming the judiciary can define and 
measure “abuse,” there is reason to doubt that plaintiffs alone engage in 
abusive discovery. The judiciary’s assumption that only plaintiffs abuse 
discovery and impose asymmetric costs neglects abuse by defendants. Plaintiffs 
can assert that defendants withhold evidence, file frivolous objections, and use 
“dump truck” and warehouse discovery responses, just as easily as defendants 
can assert that plaintiffs use discovery to impose costs.151 Moreover, although 
abuse can come from both sides, some anecdotal evidence actually suggests that 
defendants are more prone to abuse. In an anecdotal survey, more plaintiffs 
(58%) reported problems with discovery than defendants (42%),152 the 
inference being that defendants are creating more problems for plaintiffs with 
discovery. Another anecdotal study reports that large corporate clients generate 
demand for “aggressiveness” or “unreasonableness” in litigation,153 which could 
be construed as abuse. That defendants might engage in abusive or protracted-
litigation tactics makes sense because their pay structure encourages protracted 
and involved litigation.154 Defendants are paid hourly. Conversely, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, who are paid on a contingency basis, have motive to refrain from 
driving up litigation costs: by imposing higher costs on defendants, plaintiffs 
 
 147.  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(c)(1), (2) (Supp. 2011); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b), (c); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1, 3.3. 
 148.  See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing Controversy 
Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities Fraud Litigation, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 637, 682–86 (2010); Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Securities Fraud Pleading After 
Tellabs, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012 at 93, 99. 
 149.  McMillian, supra note 144, at 249 n.85. 
 150.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (1989) (“We 
cannot prevent what we cannot detect; we cannot detect what we cannot define; we cannot define 
‘abusive’ discovery except in theory, because in practice we lack essential information.”). 
 151.  Hufford, supra note 145, at 639; Richard L. Marcus, Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of 
Megacases on Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 470 (2001). 
 152.  Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice under the 
1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 553 (1998). 
 153.  Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional, Professional, and 
Socio-Economic Factors that Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in 
Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 778–79 (1999). 
 154.  Davis & Cramer, supra note 118, at 980; McMillian, supra note 144, at 250 (observing that 
filing nuisance class actions is incongruous with the amount of work required by plaintiffs and counsel 
who seek to represent the class). 
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lessen available insurance proceeds to pay their claim.155 Insurance policies are 
often wasting policies that deplete as defense fees mount. Indeed, studies find 
that for plaintiffs, increased time spent on discovery is correlated with a 
decreased prospect of recovery.156 
Apart from the difficulties in quantifying “abuse,” much is unknown about 
the actual costs of litigation, including how much it costs to litigate a securities 
fraud claim, whether all claims are alike, and whether litigation costs are 
overstated or self-inflicted.157 Without answers to these questions, however, 
courts presume that defendants settle because it must be cheaper. But what 
about other long-term and intangible savings the company might achieve from 
litigation? For instance, if defendants litigate a case to a successful judgment, 
the defendant might obtain long-term monetary savings in the form of 
reputational capital, signaling its unwillingness to settle “frivolous” suits and 
thus staving off future similar suits.158 
Even if we have an accurate picture of litigation costs and can isolate costs 
attributable to abuse, nevertheless we still do not know how much, if at all, 
concerns about litigation costs matter in a settlement decision. Some empirical 
evidence available suggests that discovery costs do not drive a settlement 
decision at all. In a survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, the 
majority of defense attorneys reported that discovery costs had no effect on the 
likelihood of settlement.159 A majority of respondents also said that costs of 
litigation were the “right amount” in proportion to the stakes of the case and 
disagreed with the idea that “discovery is abused in almost every case in federal 
court.”160 In contrast, in another survey by the American Bar Association, 
almost ninety-eight percent of respondents said discovery had some influence 
over the settlement decision.161 
Scholars that have studied discovery costs and the perception of abuse have 
concluded that what appears to be rampant, is not abusive discovery, but the 
perception that discovery is abused.162 Studies by the Federal Judicial Center, 
the National Center for State Courts, and the Columbia Field Project all find 
that in most cases no discovery is ever requested, and when it is, it usually 
 
 155.  Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and 
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 156.  Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. 
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 157.  See Miller, supra note 110, at 61–63. 
 158.  See, e.g., Audra Annette Arndt, Comment, The Evolution of Michigan’s Open and Obvious 
Doctrine in Premises Liability and Recreational Activities Cases and the Lessening of Liability for 
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 162.  See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 156, at 787; Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The 
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involves no more than two requests.163 Even the studies that find an increased 
incidence of problems with discovery in complex litigation—like securities 
litigation—attribute the increase in problems reported to the increased amount 
of discovery in those cases.164 Further, to the extent discovery is more expensive 
in complex litigation, this too is rationally attributed to increased monetary 
stakes; the monetary stakes in the case have a strong relationship to the total 
litigation costs, and thus as the stakes rise, so too does the cost of discovery.165 
We now focus attention on the claim that class certification imposes 
hydraulic pressure on defendants to settle. Whether any pressure actually exists 
is debatable. Some scholars have found no evidence that class actions push 
companies into bankruptcy, but rather the opposite, that class actions save 
companies from bankruptcy.166 Moreover, class actions do not appear to 
pressure settlement any more than a traditional lawsuit. The Federal Judicial 
Center has found that the settlement rate for class actions is (73%), which is 
slightly less than the settlement rate for all other cases filed in federal court 
(77%).167 Moreover, the authors of the Federal Judicial Center study concluded 
that the merits, not class certification, drive settlement.168 
That the merits matter in settling a securities fraud claim also suggests that 
any pressure to settle is not untoward. There is pressure to settle in all 
litigation169 because the prospect of discovery and an adverse verdict is always 
present. And the law favors settling merited claims, particularly in the class 
action context.170 The concern over hydraulic pressure as a result of class 
certification justifies heightened procedural barriers only if defendants feel 
pressure to settle meritless claims.171 But there is considerable evidence that the 
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 169.  See Kanner & Nagy, supra note 167, at 690; Silver, supra note 166, at 1401–02. 
 170.  See, e.g., In re Luxottica Grp. S.p.A. Sec. Litig., 223 F.R.D. 306, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Class 
action suits readily lend themselves to compromise because of the difficulties of proof, the uncertainties 
of the outcome, and the typical length of the litigation. There is a strong public interest in quieting any 
litigation; this is particularly true in class actions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Klay v. 
Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that nothing is wrong with a defendant 
feeling pressure to settle a non-frivolous lawsuit). 
 171.  Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 25, at 362–64; see Thomas, supra note 145, at 635–41 
(summarizing how procedural barriers, such as certain restrictions under the PSLRA, are justified 
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merits do matter when settling a securities fraud claim.172 
We now examine the contention that rigorous screening is necessary for 
complex litigation, such as securities fraud claims, because juries are 
incompetent and irrational decision-makers who will be moved by emotion to 
render a “Robin Hood” type verdict against corporate defendants rather than a 
merits-based verdict.173 As it turns out however, juries are quite competent 
gatekeepers, and the contention that they do not understand a case is belied by 
empirical findings. Empirical data reveal no correlation between the complexity 
of the case and the likelihood of disagreement between a judge and jury on the 
outcome.174 In fact, empirical study reveals that the most important determinant 
of jury verdicts are the case facts, and if a judge and jury disagree in outcome, 
the disagreement is generally attributed to differences in the consideration of 
the evidence, not competency.175 Also, to the extent that jurors exhibit any kind 
of bias, this bias actually works in favor of corporate defendants. Several studies 
have confirmed that jurors exhibit an anti-plaintiff bias, not an anti-business 
bias.176 Thus, out of the securities fraud claims that have resulted in a jury trial 
since the PSLRA, defendants have won their share (four to seven, according to 
some statistics).177 Moreover, the prospect of a runaway jury award is tempered 
 
because they purport to eliminate frivolous cases). 
 172.  See Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplifying 
Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority”, 108 HARV. 
L. REV. 438, 444–49 (1994); Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: 
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 
2080–84 (1995). 
 173.  One example of the distrust of the jury’s competency in securities fraud is the suggestion that 
loss causation as measured by “lie-truth-drop” is necessary because juries cannot be trusted to sort out 
a misstatement’s real financial effect. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the 
Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 533, 533–34 (2005). 
 174.  ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 20 (2009); cf. Judge Royal 
Ferguson, Civil Jury R.I.P.? Can it Actually Happen in America?, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 795, 804 (2009). 
Even if juries do not understand complex cases, proposals for reform should focus on empowering the 
jury, for example, by encouraging juror note-taking and question asking, rather than abandoning the 
jury-system altogether. See Development in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1511–12 
(1997). 
 175.  BURNS, supra note 174, at 20–21; Valerie P. Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and 
Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 194 (1989). Judge Jed Rakoff recently 
responded to press coverage suggesting that the subject matter of a trial was too complex for jurors by 
stating that a jury is “supremely gifted” at discerning the truth of a matter. Peter Lattman, At Citigroup 
Trial, the Wit and Wisdom of Judge Rakoff, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2010), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/at-citi-trial-the-wit-and- wisdom-of-judge-rakoff/. 
 176.  See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. 717, 730–33 (2006); Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors’ Judgments of 
Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigations Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 85, 97–98 (1992).  
 177.  Eleven securities class actions have been tried to a verdict since 1996 where the conduct at 
issue was alleged to have occurred after Congress enacted the PSLRA, with seven verdicts for 
plaintiffs, and four verdicts for defendants. Kevin LaCroix, CalSTRS Wins Rare Securities Suit Jury 
Verdict Against Homestore CEO, THE D&O DIARY (Feb. 28, 2011), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2011/02/articles/securities-litigation/calstrs-wins-rare-securities-suit-jury-
verdict-against-homestore-ceo/; Adam T. Savett, Securities Class Action Trials in the Post-PSLRA Era, 
2–3 (Nov. 2010), http://www.box.net/shared/xxav75dzpf. Another eleven securities class action cases 
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by the PSLRA, which caps damages at  
the difference between the purchase or sale price paid or received . . . by the 
plaintiff . . . and the mean trading price of that security during the 90-day period 
beginning on the date on which the information correcting the misstatement or 
omission that is the basis for the action is disseminated to the market.
178
 
2. The Potential Costs to Access Barriers 
That the in terrorem rationale is incomplete and unsupported might matter 
little if the procedural barriers that rest upon it proved innocuous. Whether an 
enhanced procedural regime is likely to reduce litigation costs, as opposed to 
simply displacing them is unclear.179 Although the heightened standards for 
procedure save defendants expenses through early termination, these costs may 
be offset by increased appeals and more intense pre-trial litigation.180 The 
heightened risks of premature dismissal also force plaintiffs to spend more time 
and money to develop a case.181 Increasing the initial investment required in the 
case has three deleterious consequences to injured investors. First, it narrows 
the pool of attorneys available to pursue securities fraud claims on behalf of 
investors because few firms can surmount the financial burden of prosecuting a 
securities fraud case.182 Second, heightened procedural rules skew plaintiffs’ 
valuation of their claims downward, making them less than the actual value of 
the claim.183 Plaintiffs must account for the increased probability of dismissal 
(and the blunted effect of threatening discovery or a jury verdict) during 
settlement negotiations.184 Third, not only will plaintiffs have to undervalue their 
claims, but they also must pursue cases with greater damages to justify 
 
have been tried to verdict since 1996 where the conduct at issue was alleged to have occurred before 
the PSLRA was enacted, with three verdicts for plaintiffs, six verdicts for defendants, one mixed 
verdict, and one hung jury. Savett, supra, at 5–6. See also Dr. Jordan Milev et al., Trends 2010 Year-End 
Update: Securities Class Action Filings Accelerate in Second Half of 2010; Median Settlement Value at an 
All-Time High, NERA ECON. CONSULTING 15 (2010), http://www.nera.com/nera-files/ 
PUB_Year_End_Trends_1210.pdf. 
 178.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(e)(1) (Supp. 2011). 
 179.  Scholars have raised this question before with respect to summary judgment. See D. Brock 
Hornby, Summary Judgment Without Illusions, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 273 (2009); Samuel Issacharoff & 
George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990); Miller, 
supra note 86. 
 180.  See Miller, supra note 110, at 54–57. 
 181.  Id. at 66–67. Professor Geoffrey Miller finds that the significant premium on pre-filing private 
investigation has costs: (1) the cost of private investigation will be greater than the cost of discovery 
because defendants are not required to comply with requests by private investigators; (2) the cost of 
private investigation becomes duplicative if the case survives a motion to dismiss and the parties engage 
in discovery; and (3) private investigation is intrusive on privacy and potentially disruptive to the 
company. Miller, supra note 148. 
 182.  Miller, supra note 110, at 67. Financial ability to litigate a class action is one of the factors that 
courts use to determine whether a plaintiff is an adequate class representative and whether a firm can 
effectively serve as class counsel. See, e.g., McGowan v. Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659 F.2d 554, 559–
60 (5th Cir. 1981); Pender v. Bank of Am. Corp., 269 F.R.D. 589, 599–600 (W.D.N.C. 2010). 
 183.  See Miller, supra note 110, at 68. 
 184.  Id. at 68–69. 
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litigation, and this actually may raise litigation costs.185 
B. The Myth that Congress is Incapable of Fashioning Rules that Respond to 
Litigation Concerns and that the Jury is Incapable of Merited Fact-Finding 
The judicial access barriers that substitute the district judge for the jury are 
premised on the idea that federal judges are more nimble at rulemaking than 
Congress and more capable of fact finding than the jury. But neither of these 
judicial assumptions are necessarily true. 
First, Congress and the drafters of the Federal Rules have a long history of 
enacting statutes, rules, and amendments responsive to perceived litigation 
costs and abuses. For example, the worry about “fishing expeditions” and costly 
and lengthy depositions even predates the liberal discovery rules in notice 
pleading, and the initial drafting committee of the Federal Rules was attuned to 
these concerns relating to liberal discovery, even placing special emphasis on 
the need for input on the new discovery provisions when the committee 
solicited comment from the bar at large.186 Still, the drafters thought liberal 
notice pleading and discovery would strike the optimum balance between 
screening cases with no merit and affording merited claims their due. Since 
1970, to keep pace with changing realities in litigation—namely, the 
development of aggregate litigation—the Federal Rules and the Manual for 
Complex Litigation have been revised to contain the scope of discovery by, for 
example, providing a discovery conference to narrow disputes, allowing district 
judges to limit the scope of discovery, encouraging judges to impose sanctions 
for discovery violations, and mandating that parties engage in automatic 
disclosure to facilitate discovery.187 Congress has also modified procedural rules 
and statutes to take settlement pressure resulting from class certification into 
account: in 1966, it enacted Rule 23(f), which allows for interlocutory appeal of 
 
 185.  There are some additional costs neglected by the access barriers, including (1) the social cost 
of underenforcement of the securities laws; (2) the constitutional cost incurred by an impaired Seventh 
Amendment right; (3) the increase in the tendency of young, inexperienced lawyers to eschew trial, 
caused by the feedback effect of resolving cases procedurally; and (4) the decrease in our ability to 
assess the efficacy of private enforcement, caused by the loss of discovery procedures through which 
the merits of a claim would come to light.  
  To say jury trials in securities litigation are rare is an understatement. Over 3,400 securities 
fraud cases have been filed since 1995, but only 28 have gone to trial and only 22 have resulted in a 
verdict. Milev et al., supra note 177, at 15. Without trials and jury verdicts, legal doctrines develop in a 
vacuum and settlement negotiations become unmoored from legal doctrine. Thorsen et al., supra note 
57, at 113 (“[S]o few of these cases have gone to trial that no well-developed case law regarding the 
proof of law exists. Indeed, nearly all of the case law regarding loss has arisen in the context of motions 
to dismiss, summary judgment, class certification, evidentiary battles (admissibility of expert reports, 
for example), or settlement (where additional considerations may be in play) . . . . This means that 
concepts of loss have developed somewhat in a vacuum, uninformed by what evidence would actually 
be required and adduced at the proof stage.”); see also BURNS, supra note 174, at 89, 120. 
 186.  Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 691, 691, 695–96, 720–26, 730 (1998); see also Seymour 
Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 595, 607 (2002). 
 187.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), (d), (f), (g); Miller, supra note 110, at 55–57. 
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orders granting and denying class certification;188 in 1990, it enacted the Civil 
Justice Reform Act, which required district courts to develop and implement 
litigation-management plans to reduce litigation expenses;189 and in 1995, it 
enacted the PSLRA, which heightened pleading, stayed discovery pending a 
motion to dismiss, abolished joint and several liability, and ensured more client 
control over class actions.190 
Second, district judges are not better fact-finders than the jury, particularly 
where judges must find facts on pleadings alone. Access barriers that ask judges 
to resolve cases without a complete record on a motion to dismiss, at class 
certification, or on a motion for summary judgment force judges to rely on their 
“experience and common sense” to drive decision-making. The problem with 
asking judges to rely on their “experience and common sense” is that 
experience shapes our common sense: persons of different backgrounds see 
things—literally—very differently.191 And judges do not always recognize this 
and are prone to “cognitive illiberalism,” in which they neglect to account for 
the ways that their experience shapes their common sense.192 Thus, judges are 
unknowingly influenced by bias. 
 
 188.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). The rule drafters explicitly considered settlement pressure in enacting 
Rule 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee note to subdivision (f). The drafters of the rules and 
Congress did not use the rules to remedy the pressure from class certification with merit-based 
screening by district judges. Rather, they specifically rejected a merits screening requirement for class 
certification. See Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 189.  28 U.S.C.A. §§ 471–482 (Supp. 2011). 
 190.  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78u-4(a), (b)(1)–(3), (f) (Supp. 2011). The PSLRA’s damages cap also protects 
defendants by limiting damages to the difference between the purchase or sale price paid and the mean 
trading price of that security during the ninety days from the corrective disclosure. Id. § 78u-4(e)(1). 
 191.  RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 68 (2008). 
When deliberating about what course of action is just, individuals will rarely have direct access 
to the answers themselves. Instead, they must judge whether the stories in which the 
information is embedded are plausible and are consistent with one another. And when 
interpreting a legal standard, they must consider which of the norms implicit in the standard 
are relevant, given the facts as they know them. All the empirical evidence we have suggests 
that individuals will do this through interlocking social and cognitive mechanisms that cause 
them to rely on a culturally contingent situation sense; an implicit knowledge of how the 
material and social world works.  
Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1455, 1468 
(2010). 
 192.  Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of 
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 842–43 (2009). Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman use Scott 
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Supreme Court’s first-ever multi-media decision, as an example of 
cognitive illiberalism. Id. at 838. In Scott, the Court addressed whether a car chase that the plaintiff 
initiated posed a substantial and serious risk to the safety of others such that police were justified in 
ramming his car to stop him. Scott, 550 U.S. at 374. The Court said that the video-tape of the incident 
was clear: the plaintiff was driving like a madman. Id. at 378–80. Justice Stevens thought the tape 
evidenced something different. Id. at 390–93 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Rather than take on this 
dissenting view, the Court posted the tape to the internet and said it spoke for itself. Id. at 379 n.5. 
However, a survey of over 1300 people revealed that the tape was not speaking clearly. Id.at 841. 
Although “[a] fairly substantial majority did interpret the facts the way the Court did,” the “members 
of various subcommunities did not. African Americans, low-income workers, and residents of the 
Northeast, for example, tended to form more pro-plaintiff views of the facts than did the Court. So did 
individuals who characterized themselves as liberals and Democrats.” Id. at 841–42. 
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There is evidence that judicial resolution by implicit bias occurs in civil 
rights cases, which serve as a useful proxy for securities fraud cases in that both 
are likely to be thinly pleaded, that is, they rest on circumstantial as opposed to 
direct evidence, which is in the hands of defendant.193 A recent study of civil 
rights cases has made three findings regarding Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,194 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal’s195 call to district judges to rely on “common sense and 
experience” when deciding motions to dismiss.196 First, African-American 
plaintiffs are 2.66 times more likely to have their claims dismissed under Bell 
Atlantic and Iqbal than they were under Conley v. Gibson’s197 pleading 
standard.198 Second, African-American pro se plaintiffs’ claims are 2.10 times 
more likely to have their claims dismissed.199 And finally and most significantly, 
after Iqbal and Bell Atlantic, Caucasian judges dismiss African-American 
plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination at a higher rate (57.5%) than African-
American judges (33.3%).200 These findings, the study concludes, suggest that 
district judges, without merits-discovery, rely on automatic stereotypes and 
implicit associations about race and discrimination that often turn out to be 
wrong when deciding claims.201 
If the premise of that article is correct, then injecting a judge’s experience 
and common sense when weighing inferences, for example, makes room for 
judges to rely on stereotypes (likely implicit) or other heuristics to decide cases. 
In securities litigation, this may already be a problem; professors Stephen M. 
Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati have catalogued some of the flawed decision-
making heuristics or shortcuts that judges already employ (consciously or 
subconsciously) as a substitute for analyzing the complexity of cases when 
deciding securities fraud suits.202 If heuristics further permeate motions to 
 
 193.  See Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 125–26, 159 
(2011) (“[C]ases that are most vulnerable to dismissal for having thin pleadings are ones that rely on 
state of mind allegations, which are the heart of most civil rights and private discrimination claims.”). 
 194.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 195.  566 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 196.  Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social-Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect 
on Claims of Race Discrimination, MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783065. 
 197.  355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 198.  Quintanilla, supra note 196, at 33. 
 199.  Id. at 34. Another study likewise found that the percentage of 12(b)(6) motions granted in all 
cases brought by pro se plaintiffs grew from Conley (67%) to Bell Atlantic (69%) to Iqbal (85%). 
Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. 
REV. 553, 615 (2010). These findings suggest that the form complaints appended to the Rules 
(commonly relied upon by pro se litigants) are insufficient, which might lull litigants into filing a suit 
that would be dismissed. 
 200.  Quintanilla, supra note 196, at 207. 
 201.  Id. at 23–24. 
 202.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way 
Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 
118–36 (2002) (explaining that heuristics that substitute for analysis of materiality include puffery, 
bespeaks caution, zero price change, and trivial matters; heuristics that substitute for analysis of 
whether the defendant likely acted with a culpable state of mind include fraud by hindsight, internal 
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dismiss, motions for class certification, or decisions on the admissibility of 
experts, plaintiffs will have to overcome these misguided assumptions usually 
without any discovery to back them up. 
In addition, the outgrowth of Tellabs that steeply discounts circumstantial 
evidence of a fraudulent intent does not account for the rationality of 
fraudulent behavior. Perpetrating a fraud, particularly where the potential 
pecuniary gains are great, can be rational, wealth-maximizing behavior.203 Taken 
most generally, economic theory assumes corporate executives are more likely 
to commit fraud when it is in their pecuniary interest to do so than when it is 
not.204 The premise of this assumption is what allows plaintiffs to allege scienter 
by alleging “motive and opportunity” alone. In some federal circuits (more 
before Tellabs than after205) plaintiffs could show that defendants acted with a 
culpable mental state by alleging only that the defendant (1) had an opportunity 
to commit fraud by misrepresentation, omission, manipulation or otherwise; 
and (2) would personally benefit by committing the fraud.206 
Moreover, the idea that fraud may be rational, wealth-maximizing behavior 
is what causes Professors Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller to argue 
that, at times, fraud is even consistent with executives’ fiduciary duties.207 For 
example, after Dura it may be optimal for companies subject to the federal 
securities laws to obscure or delay negative information in order to maximize 
investor welfare. Interpreting Dura to require a “lie-truth-drop” and requiring 
plaintiffs to isolate fraud as the only cause of moving the company’s stock price 
encourages companies to structure disclosures to minimize the effect on stock 
price.208 Companies can control the timing of their disclosures to enable them to 
manipulate the extent to which the company’s stock price reacts to new 
information, and thus, for companies with multiple projects, Dura enables 
companies to over-represent its value and minimize the consequences of fraud 
 
forecasts, whether something sounds in fraud, and unusual insider stock sales; and heuristics that 
substitute for analysis of whether the defendant had a duty to disclose information include routine 
forecasts and extreme departures). 
 203.  See, e.g., Daniel T. Ostas, When Fraud Pays: Executive Self-Dealing and the Failure of 
Self-Restraint, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 571, 574, 601 (2007) (stating “[t]raditional economic analysis assumes 
that people, including corporate executives, are motivated by pecuniary, or material, self-interest” and 
finding that fraud can be rational, wealth-maximizing behavior when the expected payout of the fraud 
is greater than the deterrent force of the law). 
 204.  Id. at 574. 
 205.  See, e.g., Institutional Invs. Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 276–79 (3d Cir. 2009) (saying 
plaintiffs can no longer allege scienter by alleging motive and opportunity alone after Tellabs). After 
Tellabs, the Second Circuit has, however, reaffirmed that plaintiffs can plead scienter with motive and 
opportunity alone. See, e.g., ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase 
Co., 553 F.3d 187, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 206.  See Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Rule 9(b), in 5 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON 
SECURITIES FRAUD § 10:115 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing the motive-and-opportunity test for pleading 
scienter). 
 207.  Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the 
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (1990). 
 208.  Spindler, supra note 58, at 656–57. 
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by offsetting fraud in one project with success in another.209 And for single-
project companies, requiring plaintiffs to pinpoint a post-transaction decline 
and to attribute that decline to only the fraud encourages companies to create 
intervening causes and commingle revelation of the fraud with other bad news 
or even fabricate other news to mask the effect of the revelation of the fraud.210 
Another one of the shortcuts judges rely upon when forced to engage in pre-
trial fact-finding without any facts is to put talismanic significance on event 
studies that purport to measure the effect of the fraud on the stock price and 
presumably provide objective evidence of loss causation.211 By emphasizing 
event studies, however, some courts refuse to recognize the full range of 
inflationary loss as cognizable economic loss. Rather, courts insist on a “lie-
truth-drop” formula for securities fraud, and want an event study to show that 
the drop is attributable to the truth (or a “corrective disclosure” or a 
“revelation of the fraud”) and the truth alone. Judicial acceptance of this 
approach is not completely unfounded—indeed, it represents a simple and 
logical way of defining loss and causation. But it has no support in the text of 
the procedural rules governing securities fraud, takes too narrow a view of 
economic loss, and puts too much faith in event studies. 
Economic loss and loss causation exist whenever (1) fraud inflates a stock 
price, and (2) the investor cannot recover that overpayment.212 Courts must first 
wrestle with how inflation can occur and how it can be measured. With respect 
to this first question, Frank Torchio of Forensic Economics, Inc., has found that 
event studies are sometimes improperly used by defendants to give the illusion 
that the stock price was never inflated.213 He observes that by focusing event-
study analysis on the day the alleged fraud was made as opposed to the dates of 
the corrective disclosure, event-study analysis can be misused to negate any 
showing of inflation.214 But, as Torchio notes, the proper measure for price 
impact is from the date of disclosure because at the time of the fraud there may 
be absolutely no price impact.215 Only when the case involves what Torchio 
 
 209.  Patrick J. Coughlin et al., What’s Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Review 
the Supreme Court’s Opinion and its Import for Securities Fraud Litigation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 26 
(2005); Fisch, supra note 58, at 852; Spindler, supra note 58, at 677–80. 
 210.  See Spindler, supra note 58, at 680–85. 
 211.  According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, viewing “science” as an objective method of 
establishing factual causation in all cases is incorrect because “[f]irst, scientific standards for the 
sufficiency of evidence to establish a proposition may be inappropriate for the law, which itself must 
decide the minimum amount of evidence permitting a reasonable (and therefore, permissible) 
inference, as opposed to speculation that is not permitted,” and “[s]econd, scientists report that an 
evaluation of data and scientific evidence to determine whether an inference of causation is appropriate 
requires judgment and interpretation. Scientists are subject to their own value judgments and 
preexisting biases that may affect their view of a body of evidence.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 28 cmt. on subsection a, (c) (2005). 
 212.  Thorsen et al., supra note 57, at 95. 
 213.  Frank Torchio, Proper Event Study Analysis in Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 159, 159–60 
(2009). 
 214.  Id. at 163. 
 215.  Id. Professor Langevoort explains that if the market had been anticipating earnings of $3 per 
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terms an affirmative misstatement, a statement containing misleading 
information such that the information was not already in the total mix of 
information in the marketplace before the statement, will an event study 
focused on the date of the fraud accurately measure market impact.216 
Once a court determines that stock prices have been inflated, courts must 
then wrestle with how the loss occurred, that is, how inflation dissipated in a 
way that investors could not recover that loss. Inflation can dissipate in any 
number of ways, including by (1) a corrective disclosure, in which the full truth 
is disclosed; (2) a revelation of general improprieties; (3) raising questions or 
concerns without revealing the fraud; (4) a revelation of the company’s true 
financial condition without revealing the fraud; (5) leaking the information with 
recurrent, partial revelations; (6) general market forces driving the stock down; 
or (7) the company going bankrupt.217 This list illustrates that the loss need not 
dissipate by a corrective disclosure; and in some cases inflation can even 
dissipate before the truth is revealed.218 
Generally, event studies provide good evidence that new information has 
affected a stock price, but they suffer from several shortcomings that relegate 
the mode of analysis to good rather than conclusory evidence. 
First, by making alterations within generally accepted parameters of 
operating an event study, experts can alter results and call reliability into 
question. For example, an expert can alter the length of an event window, or 
even skew the probability of detecting an abnormal return by altering the 
sample size.219 Second, event-study analysis without merits discovery functions 
poorly when a corrective disclosure is commingled with other bad news.220 
Decisions like Oscar, however, require an event study to isolate the effect of the 
fraud from the tangle of other factors, and thus encourage companies to 
commingle a corrective disclosure with other bad news to obscure the effect the 
corrective disclosure has on the fraud. Without merits discovery though it is 
difficult to tell whether the other news is truly unrelated to the fraud.221 Third, 
 
share, then lying by reporting earnings of $3 would probably have little if any impact on the price of the 
stock. Yet if the true earnings were $2.50, the $3 lie would be harmful in the sense that telling the truth 
would have moved the price downward. Courts that simply assume that the lack of a price impact at the 
time of the alleged misrepresentation necessarily undermines plaintiffs’ case are wrong—an example of 
expert testimony put forth by the defense lawyers getting in the way of common sense. Donald C. 
Langevoort, Compared to What? Econometric Evidence and the Counterfactual Difficulty, 35 J. CORP. 
L. 183, 185 (2009); see Spindler, supra note 58, at 663–64 (stating that analyzing market impact will be 
difficult when a company conceals bad news to avoid a negative market reaction). 
 216.  Torchio, supra note 213, at 166. 
 217.  Thorsen et al., supra note 57, at 101–07. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  For example, by varying the sample size of studied companies from 25 to 100, the probability 
of detecting an abnormal return of 0.5% increases from 24% to 71%, the probability of detecting an 
abnormal return of 1% increases from 71% to 94%, and the probability of detecting an abnormal 
return of 2% increases from 71% to 100%. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 107, at 230–32. 
 220.  See Bruegger & Dunbar, supra note 45, at 25–26; Fisher, supra note 68, at 880. 
 221.  See Fisch, supra note 58, at 851–52 (expressing concern about a judge’s ability to determine 
how much of a drop in price could be attributed to fraud). 
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for an event study to adequately account for other factors and isolate the effect 
of the fraud on the company’s stock price, the event study must use a multi-
factor model to control for the confounding information.222 Identifying these 
factors for the model without merits discovery, however, proves difficult. 
Fourth, event studies are less reliable when the defendant has made recurring 
misrepresentations.223 For recurring misrepresentations, the inflation per share 
changes throughout the class period, but when the company issues a corrective 
disclosure, it does not correct each distinct misrepresentation in an isolated 
announcement. In this situation, an event study can overestimate or 
underestimate the inflation per share as the corrective disclosure may contain 
more or less information than was known during the class period.224 
Focus on event-study analysis and the “lie-truth-drop” formula works 
against defendants as well. Professor Langevoort points out that the emphasis 
on an event study that measures a corrective disclosure implicitly uses as a 
causation counterfactual (the benchmark from which we measure the historical 
state of the world) a world of “truth telling,” where the company told the truth, 
investors knew about the fraud, and did not purchase stock.225 Yet, as Professor 
Langevoort notes, mandatory disclosure is not always the correct 
counterfactual; the correct counterfactual may, in some cases, be a world in 
which the defendant said nothing (a “silence” counterfactual) rather than one in 
which the defendant disclosed information.226 The emphasis on an event study 
and corrective disclosure neglects this counterfactual. Moreover, deciding the 
counterfactual question on pleadings and without a record robs the defendant 
of an opportunity to present counterfactual arguments to a jury that might 
cancel out (or produce some other result).227 Emphasis on a corrective 
disclosure and a later drop in stock price may also artificially inflate the 
measure of the plaintiffs’ damages. “[C]orrective disclosures are often 
prompted by the materialization of an undisclosed risk,” and thus “the stock 
price drop in response to such a disclosure is likely to reflect that 
materialization rather than simply nondisclosure of the risk itself.”228 The stock 
price drop then may be greater than the initial price inflation even if the drop in 
stock price is entirely responsive to the corrective disclosure.229 
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 223.  Id. at 26. 
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 229.  Id. at 851–52. Professor Fisch also notes that corrective disclosures reveal the bad news itself 
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management integrity and the anticipated likelihood of future litigation, further driving the stock price 
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Event studies mark a starting point, but remaining questions must be 
ferreted out with additional merits discovery and cross examination. Causation 
is an elusive concept in the law (and thus a classic fact question for the jury230), 
and loss causation in particular is “ungainly, exotic, [and] confusing.”231 This was 
the gist of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dura: plaintiffs had to plead only that 
inflation occurred, and then at the evidentiary stage of litigation plaintiffs would 
show how that inflation dissipated.232 But despite the challenges the issue of loss 
causation presents, the Supreme Court required at a minimum that plaintiffs 
also allege how the inflation dissipated.233 Some courts have recognized the 
nuances of economic analysis and inflationary loss apart from the “lie-truth-
drop” scenario, which bodes well for injured investors.234 But the simplicity of 
the “lie-truth-drop” formula and the comfort of a purportedly objective analysis 
for causation is luring for judges considering the issue of loss causation before 
discovery and trial. 
C. The Flawed Assumption that Merits-Based Screening Precludes Only 
Frivolous Claims 
The judiciary assumes its access barriers separate out only frivolous claims. 
But as a result of the new pleading rules, merited claims face a greater prospect 
of dismissal where state of mind is involved. Studies that address the impact of 
heightened pleading for civil rights claims have found an increased rate of 
dismissal for merited claims. Bell Atlantic and Iqbal have increased the dismissal 
rate for civil rights cases from 50% under Conley, to 60% under Iqbal.235 
Professor Alexander A. Reinert finds that for civil rights cases, plausibility 
pleading (or, heightened pleading) is no better than traditional, liberal notice 
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pleading at filtering out meritless claims, yet the rate of dismissal has risen.236 
The lesson here is that merited cases that are dependent on circumstantial 
evidence, like civil rights claims or securities fraud claims, which require a 
particularized allegation of the defendant’s state of mind, face an increased rate 
of dismissal.237 
The heightened procedural barriers of the PSLRA already have caused 
merited claims to be tossed by district judges at a greater rate. Stephen Choi has 
found that a significant portion of merited claims without pre-filing “hard 
evidence” (an accounting restatement or an accompanying SEC action) or 
claims against companies engaged in smaller offerings face a higher dismissal 
rate after the heightened procedural bars were set in place by the PSLRA.238 A 
study on the effect of Dura has likewise found that less class actions were filed 
after Dura and the number of smaller settlements has declined as well.239 
The increased dismissal of merited claims results in under-enforcement of 
the securities laws, which undermines the integrity of American markets. As an 
example of just one consequence of declining merited litigation, two studies 
have found that the reduction in securities litigation has reduced audit quality 
and manager incentives to report truthfully.240 By using the cost of equity capital 
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as a proxy for the quality of financial information, one of these studies found 
that the quality of financial information decreased after the enactment of the 
PSLRA.241 The other study found that after the PSLRA diminished the prospect 
of a lawsuit, there was an increase in income-increasing discretionary accruals 
for auditor companies, which the authors posit means a decreased incentive for 
auditors to curtail earnings management (or cooking the books) by clients.242 
V 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of access barriers that largely substitute the district judge as the 
fact-finder on a motion to dismiss, class certification, and summary judgment, 
injured investors face significant obstacles to recovery under Rule 10b-5. The 
barriers that rewrite rules of procedure for securities fraud to achieve the goals 
of preventing discovery and sparing defendants the burden of frivolous 
litigation pose both significant constitutional and practical concerns. Eschewing 
the formal rulemaking process resembles a usurpation of the legislative’s 
rulemaking function. And replacing the jury with a pre-trial fact-finding judge 
and requiring plaintiffs to meet a burden of proof equal to or greater than the 
burden at trial raises serious Seventh Amendment questions. The constitutional 
concerns aside, the wisdom of these access barriers is doubtful. The premise 
that defendants are forced in terrorem to settle is incomplete and unsupported. 
Moreover, merits-based screening requires judges to engage in fact-finding 
without facts, and thus, when deciding cases judges rely on extrajudicial 
information, inferences, and assumptions—even about human behavior and 
motives—that often turn out to be wrong. 
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